Tag Archives: Prediction In Cognition

Humans routinely miss important information that is \u2018right in front of our eyes\u2019, from overlooking typos in a paper to failing to see a cyclist in an intersection. Recent studies on these \u2018Looked But Failed To See\u2019 (LBFTS) errors point to a common mechanism underlying these failures, whether the missed item was an unexpected gorilla, the clearly defined target of a visual search, or that simple typo. We argue that normal blindness is the by-product of the limited-capacity prediction engine that is our visual system. The processes that evolved to allow us to move through the world with ease are virtually guaranteed to cause us to miss some significant stimuli, especially in important tasks like driving and medical image perception.

We highlight a novel brain correlate of prediction, the prediction potential (or PP), a slow negative-going potential shift preceding visual, acoustic, and spoken or written verbal stimuli that can be predicted from their context. The cortical sources underlying the prediction potential reflect perceptual and semantic features of anticipated stimuli before these appear.

(no abstract).

From the noisy information bombarding our senses, our brains must construct percepts that are veridical – reflecting the true state of the world – and informative – conveying what we did not already know. Influential theories suggest that both challenges are met through mechanisms that use expectations about the likely state of the world to shape perception. However, current models explaining how expectations render perception either veridical or informative are mutually incompatible. While the former propose that perceptual experiences are dominated by events we expect, the latter propose that perception of expected events is suppressed. To solve this paradox we propose a two-process model in which probabilistic knowledge initially biases perception towards what is likely and subsequently upweights events that are particularly surprising.