Steven T. Piantadosi, Dyana C.Y. Muller, Joshua S. Rule, Karthikeya Kaushik, Mark Gorenstein, Elena R. Leib, Emily Sanford, Why concepts are (probably) vectors, Trends in Cognitive Sciences, Volume 28, Issue 9, 2024, Pages 844-856 DOI: 10.1016/j.tics.2024.06.011.
For decades, cognitive scientists have debated what kind of representation might characterize human concepts. Whatever the format of the representation, it must allow for the computation of varied properties, including similarities, features, categories, definitions, and relations. It must also support the development of theories, ad hoc categories, and knowledge of procedures. Here, we discuss why vector-based representations provide a compelling account that can meet all these needs while being plausibly encoded into neural architectures. This view has become especially promising with recent advances in both large language models and vector symbolic architectures. These innovations show how vectors can handle many properties traditionally thought to be out of reach for neural models, including compositionality, definitions, structures, and symbolic computational processes.