Robert Axelrod; William D. Hamilton, The Evolution of Cooperation, Science, New Series, Vol. 211, No. 4489. (Mar. 27, 1981), pp. 1390-1396 https://ee.stanford.edu/~hellman/Breakthrough/book/pdfs/axelrod.pdf.
Cooperation in organisms, whether bacteria or primates, has been a
difficulty for evolutionary theory since Darwin. On the assumption that interactions
between pairs of individuals occur on a probabilistic basis, a model is developed
based on the concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy in the context of the
Prisoner’s Dilemma game. Deductions from the model, and the results of a computer
tournament show how cooperation based on reciprocity can get started in an asocial
world, can thrive while interacting with a wide range of other strategies, and can resist
invasion once fully established. Potential applications include specific aspects of
territoriality, mating, and disease.