Category Archives: Psycho-physiological Bases Of Engineering

A proposal that explains why the human brain seems bayesian but finds difficulties in using probabilities: because it uses sampling

Adam N. Sanborn, Nick Chater, Bayesian Brains without Probabilities, Trends in Cognitive Sciences, Volume 20, Issue 12, 2016, Pages 883-893, ISSN 1364-6613, DOI: 10.1016/j.tics.2016.10.003.

Bayesian explanations have swept through cognitive science over the past two decades, from intuitive physics and causal learning, to perception, motor control and language. Yet people flounder with even the simplest probability questions. What explains this apparent paradox? How can a supposedly Bayesian brain reason so poorly with probabilities? In this paper, we propose a direct and perhaps unexpected answer: that Bayesian brains need not represent or calculate probabilities at all and are, indeed, poorly adapted to do so. Instead, the brain is a Bayesian sampler. Only with infinite samples does a Bayesian sampler conform to the laws of probability; with finite samples it systematically generates classic probabilistic reasoning errors, including the unpacking effect, base-rate neglect, and the conjunction fallacy.

How hierarchical reinforcement learning resembles human creativity, i.e., matching the psychological aspects with the engineering ones

Thomas R. Colin, Tony Belpaeme, Angelo Cangelosi, Nikolas Hemion, Hierarchical reinforcement learning as creative problem solving, Robotics and Autonomous Systems, Volume 86, 2016, Pages 196-206, ISSN 0921-8890, DOI: 10.1016/j.robot.2016.08.021.

Although creativity is studied from philosophy to cognitive robotics, a definition has proven elusive. We argue for emphasizing the creative process (the cognition of the creative agent), rather than the creative product (the artifact or behavior). Owing to developments in experimental psychology, the process approach has become an increasingly attractive way of characterizing creative problem solving. In particular, the phenomenon of insight, in which an individual arrives at a solution through a sudden change in perspective, is a crucial component of the process of creativity. These developments resonate with advances in machine learning, in particular hierarchical and modular approaches, as the field of artificial intelligence aims for general solutions to problems that typically rely on creativity in humans or other animals. We draw a parallel between the properties of insight according to psychology and the properties of Hierarchical Reinforcement Learning (HRL) systems for embodied agents. Using the Creative Systems Framework developed by Wiggins and Ritchie, we analyze both insight and HRL, establishing that they are creative in similar ways. We highlight the key challenges to be met in order to call an artificial system “insightful”.

Survey of Cognitive Offloading

Evan F. Risko, Sam J. Gilbert, Cognitive Offloading, Trends in Cognitive Sciences, Volume 20, Issue 9, 2016, Pages 676-688, ISSN 1364-6613, DOI: 10.1016/j.tics.2016.07.002.

If you have ever tilted your head to perceive a rotated image, or programmed a smartphone to remind you of an upcoming appointment, you have engaged in cognitive offloading: the use of physical action to alter the information processing requirements of a task so as to reduce cognitive demand. Despite the ubiquity of this type of behavior, it has only recently become the target of systematic investigation in and of itself. We review research from several domains that focuses on two main questions: (i) what mechanisms trigger cognitive offloading, and (ii) what are the cognitive consequences of this behavior? We offer a novel metacognitive framework that integrates results from diverse domains and suggests avenues for future research.

A nive review of reinforcement learning from the perspective of its physiological foundations and its application to Robotics

Cornelius Weber, Mark Elshaw, Stefan Wermter, Jochen Triesch and Christopher Willmot, Reinforcement Learning Embedded in Brains and Robots, Reinforcement Learning: Theory and Applications, Book edited by Cornelius Weber, Mark Elshaw and Norbert Michael Mayer, ISBN 978-3-902613-14-1, pp.424, January 2008, I-Tech Education and Publishing, Vienna, Austria. (Local copy)

On how the calculus of utility of actions drives many human behaviours

Julian Jara-Ettinger, Hyowon Gweon, Laura E. Schulz, Joshua B. Tenenbaum, The Naïve Utility Calculus: Computational Principles Underlying Commonsense Psychology, Trends in Cognitive Sciences, Volume 20, Issue 8, 2016, Pages 589-604, ISSN 1364-6613, DOI: 10.1016/j.tics.2016.05.011.

We propose that human social cognition is structured around a basic understanding of ourselves and others as intuitive utility maximizers: from a young age, humans implicitly assume that agents choose goals and actions to maximize the rewards they expect to obtain relative to the costs they expect to incur. This \u2018naïve utility calculus\u2019 allows both children and adults observe the behavior of others and infer their beliefs and desires, their longer-term knowledge and preferences, and even their character: who is knowledgeable or competent, who is praiseworthy or blameworthy, who is friendly, indifferent, or an enemy. We review studies providing support for the naïve utility calculus, and we show how it captures much of the rich social reasoning humans engage in from infancy.

Evidences that the brain encodes numbers on an internal continous line and that the zero value is also represented

Luca Rinaldi, Luisa Girelli, A Place for Zero in the Brain, Trends in Cognitive Sciences, Volume 20, Issue 8, 2016, Pages 563-564, ISSN 1364-6613, DOI: 10.1016/j.tics.2016.06.006.

It has long been thought that the primary cognitive and neural systems responsible for processing numerosities are not predisposed to encode empty sets (i.e., numerosity zero). A new study challenges this view by demonstrating that zero is translated into an abstract quantity along the numerical continuum by the primate parietofrontal magnitude system.

Interesting hypothesis about how cognitive abilities can be modelled with closed control loops that run in parallel -using hierarchies of abstraction and prediction-, traditionally used just for low-level behaviours

Giovanni Pezzulo, Paul Cisek, Navigating the Affordance Landscape: Feedback Control as a Process Model of Behavior and Cognition, Trends in Cognitive Sciences, Volume 20, Issue 6, June 2016, Pages 414-424, ISSN 1364-6613, DOI: 10.1016/j.tics.2016.03.013.

We discuss how cybernetic principles of feedback control, used to explain sensorimotor behavior, can be extended to provide a foundation for understanding cognition. In particular, we describe behavior as parallel processes of competition and selection among potential action opportunities (‘affordances’) expressed at multiple levels of abstraction. Adaptive selection among currently available affordances is biased not only by predictions of their immediate outcomes and payoffs but also by predictions of what new affordances they will make available. This allows animals to purposively create new affordances that they can later exploit to achieve high-level goals, resulting in intentional action that links across multiple levels of control. Finally, we discuss how such a ‘hierarchical affordance competition’ process can be mapped to brain structure.

Physiological evidences that visual attention is based on predictions

Martin Rolfs, Martin Szinte, Remapping Attention Pointers: Linking Physiology and Behavior, Trends in Cognitive Sciences, Volume 20, Issue 6, 2016, Pages 399-401, ISSN 1364-6613, DOI: 10.1016/j.tics.2016.04.003.

Our eyes rapidly scan visual scenes, displacing the projection on the retina with every move. Yet these frequent retinal image shifts do not appear to hamper vision. Two recent physiological studies shed new light on the role of attention in visual processing across saccadic eye movements.

“Nexting” (predicting events that occur next, possibly at different time scales) implemented in a robot through temporal difference learning and with a large number of learners

Joseph Modayil, Adam White, Richard S. Sutton (2011), Multi-timescale Nexting in a Reinforcement Learning Robot, arXiv:1112.1133 [cs.LG]. ARXIV, (this version to appear in the Proceedings of the Conference on the Simulation of Adaptive Behavior, 2012).

The term “nexting” has been used by psychologists to refer to the propensity of people and many other animals to continually predict what will happen next in an immediate, local, and personal sense. The ability to “next” constitutes a basic kind of awareness and knowledge of one’s environment. In this paper we present results with a robot that learns to next in real time, predicting thousands of features of the world’s state, including all sensory inputs, at timescales from 0.1 to 8 seconds. This was achieved by treating each state feature as a reward-like target and applying temporal-difference methods to learn a corresponding value function with a discount rate corresponding to the timescale. We show that two thousand predictions, each dependent on six thousand state features, can be learned and updated online at better than 10Hz on a laptop computer, using the standard TD(lambda) algorithm with linear function approximation. We show that this approach is efficient enough to be practical, with most of the learning complete within 30 minutes. We also show that a single tile-coded feature representation suffices to accurately predict many different signals at a significant range of timescales. Finally, we show that the accuracy of our learned predictions compares favorably with the optimal off-line solution.

Theoretical models for explaining the human (quick) decicion-making process

Roger Ratcliff, Philip L. Smith, Scott D. Brown, Gail McKoon, Diffusion Decision Model: Current Issues and History, Trends in Cognitive Sciences, Volume 20, Issue 4, April 2016, Pages 260-281, ISSN 1364-6613, DOI: 10.1016/j.tics.2016.01.007.

There is growing interest in diffusion models to represent the cognitive and neural processes of speeded decision making. Sequential-sampling models like the diffusion model have a long history in psychology. They view decision making as a process of noisy accumulation of evidence from a stimulus. The standard model assumes that evidence accumulates at a constant rate during the second or two it takes to make a decision. This process can be linked to the behaviors of populations of neurons and to theories of optimality. Diffusion models have been used successfully in a range of cognitive tasks and as psychometric tools in clinical research to examine individual differences. In this review, we relate the models to both earlier and more recent research in psychology.